El concepto de libertad está entre los supuestos filosóficos fundamentales de toda la doctrina de los Derechos Humanos. Ese concepto ha sido analizado por Kant como seguramente lo han hecho muy pocos filósofos. Constituye el concepto central y el punto de apoyo de todo su sistema. Merece, por tanto, un análisis específico y ver en qué medida puede iluminar la doctrina de los Derechos Humanos. Un concepto tan fundamental es, sin embargo, un verdadero misterio, algo indescifrable para Kant. Es una (...) realidad que tenemos que suponer para poder comprender el resto del Universo, pero que a ella misma no la podemos comprender; sólo eso: suponerla. (shrink)

Philosophical feminism is the only coherent philosophy with universal implications that provides a theoretical alternative to patriarchal thought and sociopolitical structures. I distinguish between a patriarchal logic of power and a feminist logic of pleasure that leads to an enlightened ethical hedonism, a pleasure-centered, feminist ethical framework based on a cooperative rather than authoritarian model of social relations.

In this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the ad hominem-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the ad hominem, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or (...) tu quoque types. I propose to reconstruct the two Aristotelian versions (see sections 1 and 2), which have been recognized again in the ninteenth century (sec. 3). Finally, I examine whether or not it was considered as a fallacious dialogue device by Aristotle and by A. Schopenhauer (sec. 4). (shrink)

In this paper I try to shed light on platonic criticism of mathematicians for taking hypotheses as principles. The mathematician is forced to resort to hypotheses and go beyond the sensible, but he does, according to Plato, ignoring his own abilities. In this sense, his attitude is similar to that of the majority, lover of opinions, unaware that only thanks to the help of thought is it possible to identify what is offered to the senses. This interpretation fits the dream (...) metaphor, which Plato uses to describe both the attitude of the mathematician and that of the majority. (shrink)

Este Homenaje a Julia Iribarne nos ha dado la ocasión de recordar la doble dedicación de nuestra ilustre colega a la filosofía y a las letras. Mi función, en este Homenaje, será ocuparme de su breve pero valiosa labor literaria, dar cuenta de su significación y lugar dentro de su obra total. Me propongo hacer una presentación amplia de sus cinco obras de creación, y luego una aproximación fenomenológica a dos de ellas, elegidas en particular para este trabajo: el libro (...) de cuentos Sueño de sombras, y la novela Por las calles de Dios en plena siesta. Señalo en esas obras su constitución literaria y dejo indicada la posibilidad y el comienzo de una hermenéutica en continuidad con preocupaciones filosóficas de Julia Iribarne como la intersubjetividad, la identidad personal, la relación poesía/filosofía, la presencia de lo sagrado.This Homage to Julia Iribarne has given us the opportunity to remember the twofold dedication of our distinguished colleague to philosophy and literature. Mi role in this Homage is to deal with her brief but valuable literary work, and to account for its significance and place within her whole production. My purpose is to offer first a general presentation of her five creative books, and then a phenomenological approach to two of them, which have been selected for this article: Sueño de sombras, a book of stories, and Por las calles de Dios en plena siesta, a novel. Regarding these books, their literary composition is shown and I suggest the possibility and beginning of a hermeneutics that would continue Julia Iribarne’s philosophical concerns such as intersubjectivity, personal identity, the relationship between poetry and philosophy, and the presence of the sacred. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt a formalization of Descartes’ causal argument for the existence of God presented in the Third Meditation. By taking into account the philosophical setting of Descartes’ Meditations, I argue that the best logical theory to carry out the formalization is quantified modal logic where free logic is used for the first-order axioms. This fact is related to Descartes’ distinction between formal and objective reality which — to my mind — suggests both the adoption of modality (e.g. (...) true in formal vs true in objective reality) and the possibility of using empty names (i.e. names which lack reference in “formal reality”). After presenting the formal system and the reconstruction of Descartes’ proof, I will discuss some issues related to the philosophical import of the formalization, such as the understanding of rigid designation and lack of reference. I will argue that the formalization of Descartes’ argument has an intrinsic philosophical value for it sheds light on the structure of argument, its implicit difficulties, and the use of logic itself to understand the philosophical tradition. (shrink)

In what way do the corporatist and authoritarian legacies that modelled some Latin American labor institutions influence the opportunities for and restrictions on organizing workers in a new context? To what extent did institutional designs, together with other economic and political factors, influence the characteristics that currently distinguish the union organizations in the countries of the region? Taking into consideration the existence of a broader debate about the consequences of globalization and political democratization for unions, the contribution of historical institutionalism (...) and previous research, in this Article I compare the institutional and organizational dynamics of unions in four countries with authoritarian legacies and corporatist traditions. The Article argues that in spite of these shared traditions, the differences in the institutional designs — which have scarcely been considered in the specialized literature — have historically imposed distinctive features on the associational power of workers and unions. These features not only persist to the present day, but also translate into dissimilar trajectories of the labor movement and opportunities for organizing workers in the last decade. (shrink)

In this article I offer an explicating interpretation of the procedure of content recarving as described by Frege in §64 of the Foundations of Arithmetic. I argue that the procedure of content recarving may be interpreted as an operation that while restricting the subject matter of a sentence, performs a generalization on what the sentence says about its subject matter. The characterization of the recarving operation is given in the setting of Yablo’s theory of subject matter and it is based (...) on the relation of determination between properties. The main advantage of the proposal is its generality, for it is applicable not just to the case of abstraction principles. (shrink)

Los trabajos que aquí se comentan fueron confeccionados en diferentes períodos, algunos bastante alejados entre sí. Volver a leerlos para responder a las observaciones que integran este dossier me permitió revisar mi producción y examinarla a la luz de la distancia. Confirmé que siempre me han preocupado los mismos temas: las condiciones de la justicia y las causas de las injusticias, la calidad de la democracia y el compromiso ciudadano. Dividí el artículo en tres secciones, procurando reunir mis respuestas en (...) cierta unidad temática: Democracia deliberativa y razón pública (I), Felicidad, virtud y razón práctica (II) y Algo de neuroética (III). Las observaciones y críticas que realizaron los colegas me posibilitó mejorar algunos argumentos y aclarar ciertos puntos oscuros; confío en haberlo logrado. (shrink)

Jonathan Haidt has exhibited in several publications a strong influence by Hume as his inspiration to build up his Intuitionist Social Model especially in reference to the emotional and intuitive roots of morals. So, this article aims to go deeper into that influence to analyze, review and compare their concepts and hypotheses in order to establish common features in both Philosophers´ programs. By demonstrating some similarities between both authors -both critical to rationalism, and compelled to investigate the roots of morals (...) in Psychology-, their proposals will be compared and analyzed; and taking these critics into account the intuitionist assumptions that both Philosophers assume or could assume will be revised. In order to focus on the motivation of moral statements as a priority in Haidt research, the core of this article is dedicated to that issue. I will also explore Hume’s difficulty to conciliate his Emotivism with the rightness of moral statements that he considered necessary. Finally, my conclusions are that both positions sustain normative consequences ruled by an Ethics of Virtue. (shrink)

En este artículo pretendo echar luz sobre la distinción entre filosofía y erística en Platón y Aristóteles, dirigiendo la atención a la noción de aporía. En la sección I, sobre la base de un examen de las ocurrencias de eristikós en Menón, intento mostrar que Sócrates aparece estrechamente conectado al erístico, quien suele ser presentado como su oponente más peligroso. En la sección II, analizo la taxonomía de Aristóteles de los opositores al principio de no-contradicción en Metafísica IV, con el (...) fin de aclarar la distinción entre filósofos, genuinamente problematizados, y erísticos, que buscan la victoria verbal. En este punto, sostengo, Aristóteles sigue de cerca las enseñanzas de Platón en Menón. (shrink)

Graciela De Pierris presents a novel interpretation of the relationship between skepticism and naturalism in Hume's epistemology, and a new appraisal of Hume's place within early modern thought. Contrary to dominant readings, she argues that Hume does offer skeptical arguments concerning causation and induction in Book I, Part III of the Treatise, and presents a detailed reading of the skeptical argument she finds there and how this argument initiates a train of skeptical reasoning that begins in Part III and (...) culminates in Part IV. She goes on to demonstrate that Hume was committed to the Newtonian inductive method while rejecting the place of the supernatural in our understanding of nature. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 351-383 [Access article in PDF] Hume's Pyrrhonian Skepticism and the Belief in Causal Laws Graciela De Pierris Hume endorses in no uncertain terms the normative use of causal reasoning. The most striking example of this commitment is Hume's argument in the Enquiry against the possibility of miracles. The argument sanctions, in particular, the use of scientific reflection on uniform experience (...) issuing in causal laws of nature (E 114): "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined." 1 These words should give us pause; for how can Hume so confidently say, after his skeptical conclusions concerning our causal beliefs, that "a firm and unalterable experience has established" the laws of nature, and that we can therefore produce "proofs" against miracles? The Treatise gives rise to the same puzzle. In this text, too, Hume confidently prescribes methodical reflection based on causal reasoning. For example, in Book One, Part Three, Section Fifteen, Hume offers eight "Rules by which to judge of causes and effects." These rules are more than descriptions of our natural causal inferences. They are meant to guide us in making better causal inferences; in Hume's words they "ought to regulate" our probable reasoning since (T 149): "by them we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes." 2Moreover, Hume consistently takes Newtonian science as a model for the proper employment of causal inferences in inquiries into matters of fact and, [End Page 351] in particular, as a model to be followed in his own science of human nature. 3 This paradigm of what the science of nature ought to be is understood by Hume as an inductive, experimental inquiry. 4 In the Enquiry, for example, Hume uses the label "sciences" for "politics, natural philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c." and in the preceding discussion argues that these sciences are not a priori but are based on causal reasoning (E 164-165). Thus, there are for Hume inquiries into matters of fact and existence that amount to more than blindly following natural propensities and habit. The sciences and many of our causal inferences in common life involve more than mere belief as a sentiment. They involve, in addition, careful reflection that results in improved causal inferences and thus provides normative standards. Yet, in thus upholding the normative use of causal reasoning in science and in everyday life, Hume appears to contradict his own radical skeptical conclusions concerning our knowledge of causation and induction. I here propose a novel way to resolve this puzzle.To acknowledge the existence of a puzzle, however, amounts to accepting the now controversial view that Hume provides, and takes at face value, a radical skeptical argument concerning our knowledge of causation and induction. 5 Moreover, the attempt to resolve this puzzle involves rejecting the suggestion [End Page 352] that Hume, without awareness or concern, happily holds flatly inconsistent views. 6 It also goes against the more sophisticated suggestion that Hume lightly alternates among different psychological moods, or perhaps different perspectives, which might eventually issue in results that contradict each other but are sufficiently localized so as to prevent serious conflict. Such a view might lead us to conceive Hume's texts as an unstructured and arbitrary patchwork of reflections, driven by different psychological moods or by the embellishments of a radiant literary style. This kind of reading is unacceptable as an interpretative tool, however, as H. J. Paton has acutely noted in his criticism of the patchwork interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 7 For such a reading would place no constraints at all on the task of establishing which parts of Hume's text belong to which moods or perspectives. The suggestion that Hume offers an unstructured patchwork of reflections masks the novel and systematic distinction Hume draws between his radical philosophical... (shrink)

The present work is a review of Imaguire's book 'Priority Nominalism'. In the first part I present the fundamental idea of the book along general lines; successively, I report a resume of each chapter and I present in more details the view of the author and the dialectic of his arguments. In the final part, I highlight some strong points of the book and I attempt a formulation of a possible difficulty arising from Imaguire's proposal.

By giving the proper emphasis to both radical skepticism and naturalism as two independent standpoints in Hume, I wish to propose a more satisfactory account of some of the more puzzling Humean claims on causation. I place these claims alternatively in either the philosophical standpoint of the radical skeptic or in the standpoint of everyday and scientific beliefs. I characterize Hume’s radical skeptical standpoint in relation to Hume’s perceptual model of the traditional theory of ideas, and I argue that Hume‘s (...) radical skeptical argument concerning our causal inferences is inextricably linked to his skeptical argument concerning our idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect. I discuss Hume’s naturalistic account of the origin of our idea of necessity and offer a new reading of Hume’s two “definitions” of cause. I argue along the way against central aspects of two opposing styles of interpretation---Norman Kemp Smith’s and Annette Baier’s, on the one hand, and Robert Fogelin’s, on the other---that in my view do not appreciate the mutual autonomy of radical skepticism and naturalism in Hume. (shrink)

In the First Chapter, I give an interpretation of Kant's characterization of a priori knowledge which sharply distinguishes Kant's from an innatist conception; in this way, I distinguish Kant's transcendental explanation of a prioricity from both innatist and naturalistic explanations. ;The arguments given by Kant to support his claim that we are in fact in possession of a priori knowledge rely on his criterion of a prioricity: if a truth is necessary then it must be justified a priori. I criticize (...) the criterion's failure to account for actual cases of being justified in believing necessary truths. Finally, I discuss whether Kant has arguments to show that there is a priori knowledge which are independent of the criterion. ;In the Second Chapter, I examine the similarities and differences between Kant's and Frege's conceptions of a priori knowledge. I argue that Frege, like Kant, concentrates exclusively on the ways we must justify our beliefs in certain truths . I show, however, that Frege does not have straightforward arguments to prove that we can and do know a priori any arithmetical or logical truths, and that he does not have any straightforward explanation of the a prioricity of the laws of logic. Finally, I argue that even though a priori items of knowledge play a privileged role in Frege's project, this role differs from the one that such items have in a Kantian-transcendental project. ;In the Third Chapter, I explore whether we can make sense of the notion of a prioricity and prove that there is a priori knowledge by adopting an approach to justification which differs from both Kant's and Frege's. This approach does not concentrate on the ways we must be justified, but on the actual ways we justify our beliefs. I argue that this approach faces enormous difficulties regarding a prioricity. The central difficulty is that the actual complete justification for a belief cannot be captured exclusively in propositional terms. If a belief is based on inference, practical abilities, tendencies or dispositions enter in its justification. . . . UMI. (shrink)

Traditionally the modern theory of ideas has been discussed primarily in reference to its alleged introduction of a veil of mental items between the mind and the world, which leads, through the empiricists, to radical skepticism about the existence of an external world. Here I propose to emphasize an entirely different aspect of the Cartesian theory of ideas which, in my view, is more fundamental in opening the empiricist path that leads to Hume’s radical skepticism. I argue that what I (...) call the “phenomenological presentation” model of ultimate justification is rooted in a fundamental ambiguity between sensible and intellectual apprehension insinuated by Descartes’s view of “clear and distinct” ideas together with his emphasis on the priority of intuition over logical inference. Sensible apprehension relies on immediate acquaintance with items pheno-menologically and ostensively present before the mind as given particulars. The phenomenological presentation model takes its clues from sensible apprehension, although the items present before the mind might themselves be either ideas of the understanding, images of the imagination, sensory impressions, or material external objects. Intellectual apprehension, by contrast, as I illustrate with Leibniz’s model of our knowledge of concepts and truths of reason, consists in the discursive, non-ostensive grasping of the generality of abstract concepts and of formal structures . For Leibniz, all intellectual apprehension is unambiguously “logical discursive apprehension” as opposed to “direct ostensive apprehension.” Thus, Leibniz unmistakably disambiguates Descartes’s model in favor of a precise intellectual model. The empiricists, by contrast, correspondingly disambiguate Descartes’s conception in favor of an entirely sensible model.Tradicionalmente, a teoria moderna das idéias foi discutida principalmente em conexão com a sua suposta introdução de um véu de itens mentais entre a mente e o mundo que leva, por meio dos empiristas, ao ceticismo radical sobre a existência de um mundo externo. Aqui eu proponho enfatizar um aspecto completamente diferente da teoria Cartesiana das idéias que, na minha visão, é mais fundamental no que diz respeito a abrir o caminho empirista que conduz ao ceticismo radical de Hume. Eu argumento que o que eu chamo de o modelo de “apresentação fenomenológica” de justificação última está baseado em uma ambigüidade fundamental entre apreensão sensível e intelectual insinuada pela visão de Descartes de idéias “claras e distintas” junto com a sua ênfase na prioridade da intuição sobre inferência lógica. A apreensão sensível confia no contato imediato com itens presentes fenomenologicamente e ostensivamente perante a mente como particulares dados. O modelo de apresentação fenomenológica está inspirado na apreensão sensível, embora os itens que se apresentam perante a mente poderiam ser eles mesmos idéias do entendimento, figuras da imaginação, impressões sensórias, ou objetos externos materiais. A apreensão intelectual, por contraste, como eu ilustro com o modelo de Leibniz de nosso conhecimento de conceitos e verdades da razão, consiste na compreensão discursiva e não-ostensiva da generalidade de conceitos abstratos e de estruturas formais . Para Leibniz, toda a apreensão intelectual é claramente “apreensão discursiva lógica” por oposição a “apreensão ostensiva direta”. Assim, Leibniz claramente desfaz a ambigüidade do modelo de Descartes em favor de um modelo intelectual preciso. Os empiristas, por contraste, desfazem a ambigüidade da concepção de Descartes em favor de um modelo completamente sensível. (shrink)

Traditionally the modern theory of ideas has been discussed primarily in reference to its alleged introduction of a veil of mental items between the mind and the world, which leads, through the empiricists, to radical skepticism about the existence of an external world. Here I propose to emphasize an entirely different aspect of the Cartesian theory of ideas which, in my view, is more fundamental in opening the empiricist path that leads to Hume’s radical skepticism. I argue that what I (...) call the “phenomenological presentation” model of ultimate justification is rooted in a fundamental ambiguity between sensible and intellectual apprehension insinuated by Descartes’s view of “clear and distinct” ideas together with his emphasis on the priority of intuition over logical inference. Sensible apprehension relies on immediate acquaintance with items phenomenologically and ostensively present before the mind as given particulars. The phenomenological presentation model takes its clues from sensible apprehension, although the items present before the mind might themselves be either ideas of the understanding, images of the imagination, sensory impressions, or material external objects. Intellectual apprehension, by contrast, as I illustrate with Leibniz’s model of our knowledge of concepts and truths of reason, consists in the discursive, non-ostensive grasping of the generality of abstract concepts and of formal structures . For Leibniz, all intellectual apprehension is unambiguously “logical discursive apprehension” as opposed to “direct ostensive apprehension.” Thus, Leibniz unmistakably disambiguates Descartes’s model in favor of a precise intellectual model. The empiricists, by contrast, correspondingly disambiguate Descartes’s conception in favor of an entirely sensible model. (shrink)

En este trabajo realizo un examen crítico del reciente libro de Silvana Gabriela Di Camillo sobre la crítica de Aristóteles a la teoría platónica de las Ideas. El libro de Di Camillo es un trabajo muy serio cuya lectura recomiendo ampliamente. Sin embargo, considero que cuatro de las principales tesis que la autora defiende tienen varias dificultades y mi objetivo aquí es presentar argumentos detallados en contra de ellas: la interpretación de la distinción entre argumentos más y menos rigurosos del (...) tratado Sobre las Ideas; la tesis de que la separación es el blanco esencial de las críticas aristotélicas a las Ideas; la interpretación de las opciones que Platón tiene para responder al argumento del tercer hombre, y la tesis de que la separación de las Ideas debe entenderse como homonimia. In this paper I examine Silvana Gabriela Di Camillo's recent book on Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's theory of Ideas. Di Camillo's book is a very serious work that I highly recommend. Nevertheless, I consider that four of the main theses that the author defends face several difficulties and my aim here is to offer detailed arguments against them: the interpretation of the distinction between more and less accurate arguments of the treatise On Ideas; the thesis that separation is the essential target of Aristotle's criticisms against Plato's Ideas; the interpretation of the options available to Plato to reply to the third man argument; and the thesis that the separation of Ideas should be understood as homonymy. (shrink)

Commentaries on Hume's Treatise 1.4.1, "Of scepticism with regard to reason," have focused on the argument that an initial lack of certainty concerning the conclusion of an inference gradually diminishes to zero. In my view, Hume offers this famous argument only after, and as corollary to, a far more interesting skeptical argument concerning demonstrative reasoning, which occurs at the very beginning of Treatise 1.4.1. I focus on this neglected argument, point to its Cartesian roots, and draw a distinction between ordinary (...) doubts and a radical skeptical doubt about the inevitable interference of fallible faculties in our demonstrative inferences. Hume suggests that, in common life and science, solutions to ordinary doubts concerning human fallibility themselves rely on causal reasoning-that we have applied inferential rules correctly in any given instance is a "matters of fact" conclusion, thus it is supported by the only kind of evidence that such a conclusion can have. Hume's argument brilliantly reverses the force of the increased confidence normally acquired on the basis of such causal reasoning. Once we have realized, in the radically skeptical frame of mind, that in our attempts to improve and evaluate demonstrative reasoning we use merely causal reasoning, there is no longer the hope of a progressive adjustment of the exercise of our faculties to an assumed objective validity of our demonstrative rules. The increase in assurance by causal methods only amounts to "the addition of new probabilities," and there is no gradual transition from probability to demonstratively certain knowledge. Hume thereby reaches a radical skeptical doubt regarding the possibility of our ever attaining genuinely certain demonstrative knowledge - and, unlike Descartes, he reaches this doubt without the external device of an all-powerful deceiver. Los comentarios sobre la sección "Of scepticism with regard to reason" en A Treatise on Human Nature de David Hume se han concentrado en el argumento según el cual, la falta inicial de convicción certera acerca de la conclusión de una inferencia cualquiera disminuye gradualmente a cero. Sostengo que Hume ofrece este famoso argumento solamente después y como corolario de un argumento escéptico mucho más interesante acerca del razonamiento deductivo, el cual aparece al principio de esta sección. Me concentro en este primer argumento, señalo sus raíces cartesianas, y establezco una distinción entre dudas comunes y una duda escéptica radical acerca de la interferencia inevitable, en nuestros razonamientos deductivos, de facultades mentales falibles. Hume sugiere que, en la vida cotidiana y en la ciencia, las soluciones a las dudas acerca de la falibilidad humana, en sí mismas se apoyan en razonamientos de carácter causal: si hemos aplicado correctamente una regla inferencial o no, en una instancia específica, es en sí misma una conclusión acerca de lo que Hume llama "matters of fact". Por lo tanto, está basada en el único tipo de evidencia que tal conclusión puede poseer. El argumento brillante de Hume invierte negativamente la confianza creciente que normalmente adquirimos sobre la base de tal razonamiento causal. Una vez que tomamos en cuenta, desde el punto de vista escéptico radical, que en nuestros intentos de mejorar y evaluar razonamientos deductivos usamos meramente razonamientos causales, se cierra la posibilidad de ajustar progresivamente el ejercicio de nuestras facultades mentales a una supuesta validez objetiva de las reglas de deducción. El aumento de la confianza en nuestras inferencias está basado en métodos causales, por lo tanto resulta en "la adición de nuevas probabilidades", y no existe una transición gradual desde la probabilidad más alta hasta el conocimiento certero demostrativo. De esta manera, Hume llega a una duda escéptica radical acerca de la posibilidad de lograr conocimiento demostrativo genuinamente certero. A diferencia de Descartes, Hume obtiene esta duda radical sin apelar a un elemento externo a nuestras facultades mentales, tal como el todopoderoso que engaña en la Primera Meditación de Descartes. (shrink)

Hume’s discussion of space, time, and mathematics at T 1.2 appeared to many earlier commentators as one of the weakest parts of his philosophy. From the point of view of pure mathematics, for example, Hume’s assumptions about the infinite may appear as crude misunderstandings of the continuum and infinite divisibility. I shall argue, on the contrary, that Hume’s views on this topic are deeply connected with his radically empiricist reliance on phenomenologically given sensory images. He insightfully shows that, working within (...) this epistemological model, we cannot attain complete certainty about the continuum but only at most about discrete quantity. Geometry, in contrast to arithmetic, cannot be a fully exact science. A number of more recent commentators have offered sympathetic interpretations of Hume’s discussion aiming to correct the older tendency to dismiss this part of the Treatise as weak and confused. Most of these commentators interpret Hume as anticipating the contemporary idea of a finite or discrete geometry. They view Hume’s conception that space is composed of simple indivisible minima as a forerunner of the conception that space is a discretely (rather than continuously) ordered set. This approach, in my view, is helpful as far as it goes, but there are several important features of Hume’s discussion that are not sufficiently appreciated. I go beyond these recent commentators by emphasizing three of Hume’s most original contributions. First, Hume’s epistemological model invokes the “confounding” of indivisible minima to explain the appearance of spatial continuity. Second, Hume’s sharp contrast between the perfect exactitude of arithmetic and the irremediable inexactitude of geometry reverses the more familiar conception of the early modern tradition in pure mathematics, according to which geometry (the science of continuous quantity) has its own standard of equality that is independent from and more exact than any corresponding standard supplied by algebra and arithmetic (the sciences of discrete quantity). Third, Hume has a developed explanation of how geometry (traditional Euclidean geometry) is nonetheless possible as an axiomatic demonstrative science possessing considerably more exactitude and certainty that the “loose judgements” of the vulgar. (shrink)

La noción de sistema de equivalencias adquiere en la fenomenología merleaupon-tyana un lugar central, puesto que allí subyace una función general de transposición tácita. Se trata de un principio de comprensión sin explicación analógica, una síntesis sin análisis, tal como puede observarse, por ejemplo, en la plasticidad, la transferi-bilidad y la analogicidad que caracteriza a los hábitos. Sobre esta base, este artículo seguirá un camino regresivo a fin de desvelar que el sentido de las equivalencias y transposiciones está latente en (...) "las matrices simbólicas", que ofrecen una clave para comprender que los fenómenos de expresión, que tienen lugar en el mundo a través del cuerpo, del lenguaje, de la historia y del arte, deben ser vistos como nudos, emblemas de sentido en los que se hace visible una dimensión temporal. Las matrices simbólicas son "centros organizadores" y, por lo tanto, "centros de significación" que se retoman una y otra vez. The notion of a system of equivalences comes to have in Merleau-Ponty's phe-nomenology a central place because lying under there is a general function of tacit transposition. It is a principle for understanding without analogical explanation, i.e., a synthesis without analysis, as can be seen, for example, in the plasticity, transferability, and likeliness that characterizes habits. On this basis, the article will follow a regres-sive way in order to show that the meaning of the equivalences and transpositions is latent in "the symbolic matrixes" that offer a clue to understand that the phenomena of expression, which occur in the world by means of the body, language, history, and art, should be seen as nodes or emblems of meaning in which a temporal dimension shows itself. Symbolic matrixes are "organizing centers", and thus "centers of signi-ficance" that are taken up over and over again. (shrink)

I wish to discuss in this paper some of the problems involved in determining whether subjects on particular occasions are justified in coming to believe a proposition. I will argue that in attributing actual justification to a particular subject–subjective justification–we have to take into account factual-psychological questions and that these are the source of fundamental difficulties. These factual-psychological questions concern the beliefs someone uses in the process of acquiring another belief and the actual connections she makes among her beliefs.But why (...) should epistemologists be interested in making attributions of actual justification to particular subjects? After all, if the central goal of epistemology is to guide us in choosing rational strategies for supporting our beliefs, or to assess whether theories are well grounded or acceptable, epistemologists should be concerned with the justification a theory or proposition might have independently of anyone actually coming to believe it. This may be so, but it has to be shown that it is so. Moreover, the consideration of the factual-psychological questions involved in attributions of subjective justification seems to be necessary in some recent hybrid forms of naturalized epistemology. I call them ‘hybrid’ because, unlike Quine’s naturalized epistemology, they include in the epistemological task more than naturalistic explanations of how we acquire our language and beliefs. Besides taking into consideration the actual processes of our coming to believe or accept sentences, they also make use of epistemic notions like justification, warrant, relevant or right connection among beliefs, and so forth. (shrink)

NCG 4.0 is the latest update of the Network of Cancer Genes, a web-based repository of systems-level properties of cancer genes. In its current version, the database collects information on 537 known (i.e. experimentally supported) and 1463 candidate (i.e. inferred using statistical methods) cancer genes. Candidate cancer genes derive from the manual revision of 67 original publications describing the mutational screening of 3460 human exomes and genomes in 23 different cancer types. For all 2000 cancer genes, duplicability, evolutionary origin, expression, (...) functional annotation, interaction network with other human proteins and with microRNAs are reported. In addition to providing a substantial update of cancer-related information, NCG 4.0 also introduces two new features. The first is the annotation of possible false-positive cancer drivers, defined as candidate cancer genes inferred from large-scale screenings whose association with cancer is likely to be spurious. The second is the description of the systems-level properties of 64 human microRNAs that are causally involved in cancer progression (oncomiRs). Owing to the manual revision of all information, NCG 4.0 constitutes a complete and reliable resource on human coding and non-coding genes whose deregulation drives cancer onset and/or progression. NCG 4.0 can also be downloaded as a free application for Android smart phones. (shrink)

"Epistemology Naturalized" has been extremely influential among contemporary analytical epistemologists. Current discussions about Quine's thesis do not pay attention to a basic point: his main argument is a historical one. Quine tries to show that a naturalized epistemology is the best way out vis-a-vis the failures of traditional epistemology. In this paper, I argue that Quine's argument is based on a fictions historical account. lf that is the case, his reasons for a naturalizcd epistemology are non-sutficient.

This study examines the event- related brain potential (ERP) of 25 Mexican monolingual Spanish-speakers when reading Spanish sentences with single entity anaphora or complex anaphora. Complex anaphora is an expression that refer to propositions, states, facts or events while, a single entity anaphora is an expression that refers back to a concrete object. Here we compare the cognitive cost in processing a single entity anaphora [éstafeminine; La renuncia (resignation)] from a complex anaphora [estoneuter; La renuncia fue aceptada (The resignation was (...) accepted)].Éstaelicited a larger positive peak at 200 ms, andestoelicited a larger frontal negativity around 400 ms. The positivity resembles the P200 component, and its amplitude is thought to represent an interaction between predictive qualities in sentence processing (i.e., graphical similarity and frequency of occurrence). Unlike parietal negativities (typical N400), frontal negativities are thought to represent the ease by which pronouns are linked with its antecedent, and how easy the information is recovered from short-term memory. Thus, the complex anaphora recruited more cognitive resources than the single entity anaphora. We also included an ungrammatical control sentence [éstemasculine; La renuncia (resignation)] to better understand the unique processes behind complex anaphoric resolution, as opposed to just general difficulty in sentence processing. In this case, event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited byéstemasculineandéstafemininewere compared. Again,éstaelicited a larger P200. However, different from the experimental condition, a left anterior negativity (LAN) effect was observed foréste; the ungrammatical condition. Altogether, the present research provides electrophysiological evidence indicating that demonstrative pronouns with different morphosyntactic features (i.e., gender) and discourse parameters (i.e., single entity or complex referent) interact during the first stage of anaphoric processing of anaphora. This stage initiated as early as 200 milliseconds after the pronoun onset and probably ends around 400 ms. (shrink)

This book sets out to reorient our understanding of Hume by arguing against a realist reading of Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature. For De Pierris, Hume does not stipulate that, behind the veil...

Political science - Iran - History ; Political science - Philosophy.

In current philosophical literature we encounter many contradictions, in particular, numerous difficulties and conflicts concerned with differentiation between the logical and ontological approaches to defining the category of matter; with an adequate interpretation of the categories of essence, substance, structure, and quality; with certain problems in the dialectics of practice and theory; and so forth. In this article, I shall consider the problem of being and structure. A correct understanding of this problem presumes, above all, a fundamental distinction between the (...) basic questions of epistemology, i.e., the question of the independence of being from consciousness, and the ontological characteristics of being. (shrink)

Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are a highly complex and rich phenomena, and this has a number of important clinical, theoretical and methodological implications. However, until recently, this fact has not always been incorporated into the experimental designs and theoretical paradigms used by researchers within the cognitive sciences. In this paper, we will briefly outline two recent examples of phenomenologically informed approaches to the study of AVHs taken from a cognitive science perspective. In the first example, based on Larøi and Woodward (...) (Harv Rev Psychiatry 15:109–117, 2007), it is argued that reality monitoring studies examining the cognitive underpinnings of hallucinations have not reflected the phenomenological complexity of AVHs in their experimental designs and theoretical framework. The second example, based on Jones (Schizophr Bull, in press, 2010), involves a critical examination of the phenomenology of AVHs in the context of two other prominent cognitive models: inner speech and intrusions from memory. It will be shown that, for both examples, the integration of a phenomenological analysis provides important improvements both on a methodological, theoretical and clinical level. This will be followed by insights and critiques from philosophy and clinical psychiatry—both of which offer a phenomenological alternative to the empiricist–rationalist conceptualisation of AVHs inherent to the cognitive sciences approach. Finally, the paper will conclude with ideas as to how the cognitive sciences may integrate these latter perspectives into their methodological and theoretical programmes. (shrink)

A vigorous discussion of the value problem is under way in our philosophical publications. The problems dealt with have included: whether values exist at all; if so, what they are; what the attitude of Marxist philosophers should be toward them; and whether it is necessary at all to develop a Marxist-Leninist value theory with a distinctive set of concepts. The Symposium on Values held in Tbilisi in 1965 resulted in differing and sometimes opposite viewpoints, which were delineated most clearly. In (...) the past five years, the journals Voprosy filosofii and Filosofskie nauki have published a considerable number of articles discussing the value question ], S. I. Popov, Laszlo Sziklai, D. D. Srednii [translated in Soviet Studies in Philosophy, VIII, 1 ], and V. P. Tugarinov and A. P. Fedosova, in our journal from 1963 to 1968). (shrink)

Marcel Proust’s works contain a lot of ideas consonant with the ideas that were actively discussed by philosophers of his time. Many philosophers focused on the issues of perception, memory, will, freedom, personal identity, etc., which constituted an important part of academic curriculum. Proust familiarized himself with the issues studying philosophy at the Lyceum (he was taught by Alphonse Darlu) and at the Sorbonne. In his novel In Search of Lost Time, Proust describes an existential experience of his character viewing (...) these issues from a particular perspective, through the prism of the main character’s lifelong search of his calling. He gradually proceeds from philosophical psychology exploring the interaction of memories and impressions in a particular perception, to philosophy proper, to metaphysics aimed at understanding the truth, at going beyond time. The article traces some moments of this transition, shows that for Proust it is not just the work of memory that is important but the emphasis on those states of consciousness where the present and the past coincide, merge, and thereby we go beyond time, to eternity. The author analyzes some images and signs that accompanied the character of the novel on the way to the realization of his calling. Particular attention is paid to the Proustian interpretation of the role of art in changing and enriching the perception of the world, as well as the importance in human life of a habit in which positive and negative aspects are highlighted. Proust himself believed that a work of art is an optical instrument through which the readers begin to discern in themselves what they would otherwise fail to see. His own novel was such an instrument. (shrink)

-- 3. Escrits d'economia i finances, 1925 / pròleg de Francesc Roca.